North Korea launched its largest nuclear test yet last week – an H-bomb almost the same number of kilotons as that dropped on Hiroshima in 1945.
North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un is defiant in the face of US threats of harsher sanctions, and global condemnation of its actions. There is no indication that any manner of UN sanctions will stop him from miniaturising nuclear warheads so they can be mounted on ballistic missiles.
Kim wants to produce a variety of smaller, lighter and diversified nuclear warheads of higher strike power, with a view to hitting US targets if North Korea is attacked. The country has faced five sets of UN sanctions since its first test in 2006, but the penalties have utterly failed to curb its nuclear ambitions.
What lies behind North Korea’s intransigence is an obsessive fear of US-inspired regime change. Its leaders believe that the US has militarily occupied South Korea for the past 70 years for the sole purpose of bringing down North Korea’s communist regime. It points to Libya and Iraq as examples of what happens to weaker nations when they give up their nuclear weapons.
China strongly objects to North Korea’s nuclear programme. But China is angry, according to high-profile Chinese academics. Firing three missiles on Monday, September 5, definitely crossed a red line. Five days later came North Korea’s largest nuclear test to mark its national day on September 9 at 9am.
Following North Korea’s nuclear test in January, China had agreed to impose tougher UN sanctions, which included a crackdown on mineral exports, increased cargo inspections and financial limitations. Some are advocating that China should block the export of fuel to North Korea.
If China were to block trade flows in and out of North Korea through its borders, it could result in the collapse of the regime, although this would pose a risk to China’s national security interests. A chaotic power vacuum in North Korea could easily be filled by the US and its allies, and tens of thousands of US soldiers based in South Korea could potentially be marching up to the Chinese border.
China is also concerned about the wider geo-political implications of the US and South Korea installing an anti-missile defence system, which South Korea insists is imperative for its protection from its northern neighbour. China is staunchly opposed to the installation of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD), as it could potentially be used to launch offensive weapons within the region, not merely defensively against North Korea.
This is not the type of weapons system that China would relish having on its doorstep. So the punishment of North Korea’s leadership is destined to be harsh, but not harsh enough to bring down the regime.
With the prospect of an even greater economic squeeze on the North Korean regime, its leadership will be desperate to raise foreign currency abroad, using its diplomatic proxies as income generators.
If North Korean diplomats were active in illicit smuggling in Southern Africa over the past decade in order to raise foreign currency for the regime, this poses a more serious threat in the years to come.
The product most often sought after has been rhino horn, and circumstances would suggest that this will increasingly become the primary target for income generation.
South Africa’s national interests are at stake, as our fast-disappearing rhinos are likely to face an onslaught, particularly those in the Kruger National Park as North Korean smuggling rings operate primarily out of Mozambique. Last May a North Korean diplomat based at the embassy in Pretoria was caught with 4.5kg of rhino horn and US$100 000 in Maputo.
The North Korean Ambassador in South Africa paid $30 000 for his release and the official was asked to leave South Africa or become persona non grata.
According to a report by The Global Initiative, the North Korean embassy in Ethiopia is also being used as a transit point for the smuggling of illicit wildlife products to Asia, with embassy officials abusing their diplomatic status to act as couriers. With diplomats being able to hide illicit goods in the “diplomatic bag”, and with immunity from search in terms of their personal luggage, it has made it easy for North Korean officials to smuggle illicit goods. Although customs officials are increasingly being encouraged to search diplomatic luggage they suspect contain illicit goods.
Zimbabwe and Zambia battled to curtail the illicit smuggling activities of North Korean embassy officials, and the embassies were closed 18 years ago. In 1989, the Environmental Investigation Agency had accused virtually the entire staff of the diplomatic missions of North Korea in Zimbabwe and Zambia of being involved in the illegal rhino horn trade.
Without embassies in Zimbabwe and Zambia, North Korea has been relying on its presence in South Africa as a way to generate income through illicit smuggling. Knowing this, it is incumbent on us to ensure that the North Korean presence does not equate with more rhino horn leaving the country.