With a suspected role in the
assassination of his estranged half-brother and a string of
increasingly aggressive missile tests, the North Korean leader
appears to be testing the patience not just of Washington but
also his key ally, China. It’s a high-stakes game that may push
the region into the worst conflict it has ever seen. Kim Jong
Un’s actions have a ruthless internal logic, however, – and
while he has a plan, there is no sign that anyone has a coherent
strategy for stopping him.
On Tuesday, the Chinese Foreign Ministry warned that
Washington and Pyongyang were racing towards an unnecessary but
dangerous confrontation, calling on North Korea to listen to
international condemnation of its nuclear and missile tests.
The likelihood of Kim listening to advice or threats from
the United States, China or anywhere else seems practically
nonexistent, however.
What the North Korean leader wants is simple – to secure his
own survival and that of his regime. That means annihilating any
potential claimants to the role, and acquiring atomic weaponry
fearsome enough to deter any outsider from trying to bring him
down.
Just as important as building the ability to strike abroad
has been entrenching power at home. When his father died in
December 2011, handing him the country, many outside observers
wondered whether the younger Kim – then in his late twenties –
could assert control over older, more established members of the
elite. A South Korean think tank estimated in December that more
than 300 people had been executed since he took office,
including 140 senior officials and at least one of his uncles.
With the death of his half-sibling Kim Jong Nam at Kuala
Lumpur international Airport on February 13, the younger Kim will
have further entrenched his power. The older brother was not
seen as a threat, but if Kim did have a role in the murder the
demonstration of North Korea’s reach – and willingness to take
risks – will resonate within the establishment.
China’s financial and military support has long been vital
to the North Korean regime’s survival, with Beijing maintaining
close relations with both Kim’s father and other key officials.
The older Kim brother lived for years in China, suspected to
have been protected by Chinese intelligence in part for his
connections to his uncle Jang Song Thaek, one of the most
important power brokers in the North until his execution by Kim
shortly after he took power.
Five days after the killing of Kim Jong Nam and six days
after Pyongyang tested a ballistic missile in violation of
international sanctions, Beijing announced it was suspending
coal purchases from North Korea, essentially cutting off one of
Pyongyang’s few reliable sources of international currency – and
one of the most public shows of frustration by Beijing towards
its neighbor in recent history.
Monday’s test of a quartet of ballistic missiles – coming
just as China’s communist party settles down to its annual
Congress – will have irritated Beijing further. This week’s
action again demonstrated Kim has no intention of bowing to the
demands of any external power. It was also a reminder that US attempts to frustrate North Korea’s weapons developments have
proved largely unsuccessful.
It may be a coincidence, but this weekend the New York Times
reported what it described as an ongoing but not always
effective US campaign to interfere with North Korea’s nuclear
program.
Some of Pyongyang’s rockets have suffered largely
unexplained failures, and experts believe the United States may
have prevented scientists from receiving useful data even from
successful missile launchers. Progress, however, continues.
According to the Times, US officials have been considering
a range of new tactics including direct military strikes on
North Korean nuclear facilities or what they call “left of
launch” actions that would hope to neutralise North Korean
missiles before takeoff.
Whether such tactics by the US or others could or will ever
work is far from clear. Pyongyang and the Russian scientists it
has hired are merely trying to replicate technology that the
United States, Russia and China perfected in the 1950s or soon
after. That makes cyber attacks potentially less effective.
Successive US administrations have long hoped that China
would be able to persuade North Korea to slow its nuclear
progress and perhaps open up to the world. Chinese officials
have repeatedly attempted to reassure Washington as well as
regional players – particularly Japan and South Korea – that
they have Pyongyang under control. In the Kim era, however, such
reassurances are increasingly unconvincing.
A credible North Korean nuclear weapons program might be in
Kim’s interest, but it is a double-edged sword for China. The
more Pyongyang pushes forward with its weapons developments, the
more other countries in the region will demand the presence of
US antiballistic missile batteries. That’s something China –
which is modernising its own ballistic missile arsenal to
intimidate its regional enemies – could certainly do without.
At worst, events in North Korea might persuade Tokyo or
Seoul to pursue their own atomic weapons programs.
Beijing finds itself in an unenviable position – and Kim
likely knows it. It can, of course, go further than the coal
embargo to increase economic pressure on Pyongyang. What it
wants to avoid, however, is the regime unraveling. China has no
desire to see a united Korea, particularly one that might result
in US forces based on China’s borders. Nor does it want to
deal with economic collapse in North Korea and the potential
flow of refugees.
At the heart of Kim’s strategy is the belief that no one is
willing to confront him. To secure his position, he must push
forward with his weapons programs as quickly as possible, making
North Korea unassailable by the time anyone changes their minds.
It’s a reasonable position. Other dictatorial leaders who
gave up their weapons programs such as Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and
Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi paid a high price for those decisions.
But it also makes the world more dangerous. A man who would
order the murder of his half-brother in a crowded airport – if
South Korean intelligence is correct – seems unlikely to
hesitate if he thought annihilating many more would secure his
survival – or perhaps if he felt he had nothing left to lose.
*Peter Apps is Reuters global affairs columnist, writing on international affairs, globalisation, conflict and other issues. He is founder and executive director of the Project for Study of the 21st Century; PS21, a non-national, non-partisan, non-ideological think tank. Before that, he spent 12 years as a reporter for Reuters covering defense, political risk and emerging markets. Since 2016, he has been a member of the British Army Reserve and the UK Labour Party. The opinions expressed are his own