Stop cadre deployment and install a professional to aid the South African Police Services’ transformation from apartheid-era policing , writes Mary de Haas.
Durban - I can only assume that those calling for the reinstatement of Bheki Cele as national SAPS commissioner do not understand the nature of the crisis in policing, how it affects crime, and the type of remedial action needed.
No matter which position he occupies, Cele remains a dedicated ANC loyalist.
Cadre deployment has proven disastrous and only when the policing reins are handed to well trained, professional police members can the long road to transformation from apartheid-style policing begin.
I have known Cele for many years as a charismatic and populist politician – qualities which he brought to the SAPS; hence, no doubt, the calls for his return.
However, popularity is a likely hindrance in implementing a long overdue, ruthless clean-up, including disciplining and dismissing errant members.
The appalling state of policing is the consequence of 20 years of bungling and political interference. Shortly before the 1994 elections a senior Nationalist Party representative made a remarkably candid admission: It was impossible to purge the police, because “you’d be lucky if you were left with 10 percent of them”.
While it was known that many in the upper echelons were far to the right of FW de Klerk and had not welcomed his reforms, my research during the 1990s suggested that dismissing 90 percent of members as beyond redemption was a gross exaggeration.
The problem lay with the ultra-conservative, corrupt nature of much of the management, and the integration of homeland police forces whose training was (with some exceptions) far inferior to that received in the SAP, who had also been used as political foot soldiers.
What I documented in detail in the 1990s in KwaZulu-Natal was rampant racism, nepotism and members (many of them of a “ja baas” mentality) being promoted well beyond their levels of competence in what was essentially tokenism. Many former security police members who had colluded in gross human rights abuses (but never approached the TRC) were promoted and most of the African members promoted in this province were from the former KZP.
Many experienced, long-serving previously disadvantaged SAP members with clean records were not rewarded with promotion, and left the police.
This trend has continued and policing has lurched from bad to worse. While political dynamics in the 1990s played a part, the ANC, both nationally and provincially, colluded in the travesty of transformation.
From the outset the ANC messed up badly in its approach to policing. Instead of promoting experienced people with clean track records, who were not members of notorious apartheid units such as the SA Narcotics Bureau and the security police (they were interchangeable), it placed its cadres within the ranks of the police.
At best they were ineffectual, at worst their interventions were disastrous. They did not understand policing culture and were out of their depths.
Some, like Jackie Selebi (who had been internationally respected in human rights circles) were, like many of their comrades in government, corrupted by the power handed to them. The result was that policing continued to deteriorate and specialised units at the core of fighting crime – detective services and crime intelligence – became increasingly dysfunctional and subverted to serve political ends.
At the same time, the good guys – there are still many of them – risk their lives (often because of corrupt colleagues), without acknowledgement or the reward of promotion. Almost three months ago, I wrote to national and provincial ministers about detectives who had done sterling work in bringing down levels of violence being sidelines. I did not even receive an acknowledgement of the letter, let alone see any action. It seems competence counts for nothing in the new SAPS.
Abuse, including torture and killings, by the police continued after 1994, but have escalated in recent years, especially since the message went out to “shoot to kill”.
Marikana was simply a consequence of a well established pattern of police conduct, entrenched during the Cele tenure.
The new unit he established – the TRT (amaberets) – who were well represented at Marikana, are notorious for their brutality.
Apart from the illegality of their actions and gross human rights violations, such conduct does nothing to stem crime.
The abuse of suspects can destroy court cases, and, even if those shot are criminals, they should be identified before they kill people, and neutralised by an effective crime intelligence and criminal justice system. Crime pays, and that is why it is rampant – because of the atrocious state of the criminal justice system, starting with the police. During a recent discussion about policing with a committed ANC cadre, the subject of Johann Booysen’s reinstatement came up. I was puzzled by the charges brought against Booysen, and was not surprised that they did not stick.
Initially, the response of my ANC friend surprised me: “So what,” he asked.
I soon understood what he meant. What difference does it make? Apartheid-era police were brutal and corrupt, but they were at least well trained and efficient.
Like their predecessors, far too many of the democratic era police are exceedingly brutal and corrupt – and grossly inefficient. We have had 20 years of nepotism and tokenism posturing as affirmative action: There has been no fundamental transformation from apartheid policing.
Cadre deployment must be stopped, and promotions must be made on the basis of being long-serving, well trained and having clean, proven track records and management skills.
* Mary de Haas is a sociologist and co-ordinator of the KZN Violence Monitor
** The views expressed here are not necessarily those of Independent Media
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