If we’re complacent about a government department that runs roughshod over legal rights, simply because it is foreigners who are affected, we do so at our own risk, writes Roni Amit.
South Africa’s refugee law holds the promise of protection to those fleeing persecution – including politically motivated rape and torture – and civil wars in their home countries. Unfortunately, our Refugee Reception Offices (RROs) have failed to realise this promise and are instead characterised by inefficiency, poor quality decision-making, and corruption.
As a result, the refugee system now provides documentation for those who are able to pay, while those genuinely in need of protection but without sufficient funds are rejected as economic migrants.
This state of affairs leaves them in a perilous situation. Lacking documentation, they are at constant risk of police harassment, arrest, detention and deportation. A return journey home means a return to the violence from which they fled, possibly resulting in death.
Queue Here for Corruption, a research report released today by the African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS) and Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR), finds that corruption pervades the asylum system. Almost one third of respondents in the survey reported experiencing corruption at some stage in the process – 4.44 times on average.
The results revealed corruption at every stage of the asylum system-border crossing, access to the RRO, getting asylum documents, renewing asylum documents, getting refugee status, and renewing refugee documents.
The demand for payment has serious adverse effects, with many respondents reporting that they had at some point been unable to access the office or to renew their documents because of an inability to pay.
These numbers were significantly higher for the Marabastad RRO in Pretoria, in many instances reaching over 50 percent. Corrupt actors included security guards and RRO officials.
The results show clearly that corruption is not confined to a few bad apples, but is a more systemic problem.
These findings are troubling for a number of reasons.
Obviously, the situation has grave repercussions for those legitimately seeking the protections of the asylum system in accordance with the law. But even those with no interest in the asylum system should be concerned about a corrupt system and its implications for migration policy, for a rationally functioning public service, and for governance itself.
The pervasiveness of corruption in all aspects of the asylum process reveals a practice that is no longer bounded by legal guarantees, predictability, or administrative fairness, but is instead guided by financial incentives. Such practices may easily spread to other departments, creating perverse incentive structures within the public service. If left unchecked, the result will be a system of governance lacking in predictability, accountability, equality and fairness – a system where legal guarantees do not predict government behaviour.
In an era where issues such as Nkandla, the arms deal, and Richard Mdluli’s prosecution continue to raise questions around transparency and governance, citizens who remain complacent about a government department that runs roughshod over legal rights simply because it is foreigners who are affected do so at their own risk.
But there is another reason that calls for a decisive response to widespread corruption in the asylum system. We operate in an environment where concerns over the number of migrants in the country have resulted in xenophobic attacks, police crackdowns such as Operation Fiela, increasingly stringent immigration laws that have negatively affected tourism revenues, and the devotion of greater resources to border security.
The perpetuation of a situation that undermines the country’s migration management goals defies logic. Not only does allowing corruption to flourish prevent those in need from obtaining refugee protection, but the monetisation of refugee status also provides an incentive for irregular migration – the very problem that all of the previous measures were intended to combat.
The problem stems from a system where demand exceeds capacity and individuals face long queues, have problems accessing the RROs, must make multiple visits to resolve even a single issue, confront arbitrary discretion in obtaining and renewing documents, and often remain in the system for prolonged periods stretching over years. Such circumstances increase the opportunities for corruption, opportunities that those seeking to benefit have enthusiastically pursued.
But corruption is not inevitable.
Although government was initially unprepared for the large numbers of asylum seekers who began entering the country, it has had ample time to address the issue. Rather than enacting effective counter-measures, such as an improved immigration policy or an increase of resources in the asylum system to improve its functioning, the government has chosen to maintain the status quo and shift the focus on to the migrants themselves.
The result has been a stubborn obsession with decreasing demand without any concomitant attention to service provision. At the same time, the government has taken deliberate actions that have exacerbated the situation.
The closure of three RROs in the last four years has only increased the desperation of asylum seekers while limiting their opportunities – a situation that can easily be exploited by those seeking to profit.
More fundamentally, the government has paid virtually no attention to the poor quality of the status determination process, in which there is no link between an individual’s asylum claim and the decision the individual receives. The delinking of refugee status from protection needs creates further incentives for corruption.
Thus, even as the government continues to point to the scourge of economic migrants abusing the asylum system, it does little to combat the corruption that enables individuals without protection needs to claim asylum while denying protection to the system’s intended beneficiaries.
Although the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) has stated its commitment to root out corruption, it has failed to recognise the link between the quality and management issues described above and the flourishing of corruption.
Relying on a “one bad apple” perspective, the DHA has thus far only responded to individual allegations of corruption. The focus on specific individuals in the absence of broader efforts to target corruption has done little to alleviate the structural problem.
The DHA must address the broader management challenges at the RROs that create an environment where corruption can flourish. This means better operational systems that eliminate the space for corruption, as well as expanding services to meet demand while creating alternative mechanisms for economic migrants. The DHA must also address the quality problems in the status determination system so that decisions are truly individualised and reflect the content of the claims, further reducing the potential for status to be linked to payment.
The ACMS/LHR report provides concrete recommendations of how the DHA can achieve these goals. So far, the DHA has not taken up the invitation to address the issues identified in the report.
The delinking of refugee status from protection needs undermines the DHA’s migration management goals. The process, however, is the result of a deliberate government choice to avoid instituting measures aimed at improving services at the RROs or to address broader migration issues. The government has chosen to focus almost exclusively on the restrictive measures of border control, detentions, and deportations.
Allowing corruption to flourish undermines the utility of these efforts while contributing to the emergence of a system of public service guided by monetary incentives rather than legal obligations.
The findings of the report
Who was involved in the report?
A survey was given to 928 asylum seekers and refugees while they were exiting or waiting to enter one of the country’s five reception offices at Marabastad in Pretoria, the Tshwane Interim Refugee Reception Office, Cape Town, Musina and Durban.
Respondents represented 34 countries, almost all in Africa, but also including Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and Nepal.
The survey included quantitative questions about the border crossing, stages of the application process and respondents’ efforts to get documentation, as well as experiences with arrest and detention.
What’s led to the corruption?
Foremost is the Department of Home Affairs’s failure to respond to high levels of demand that exceeded capacity. The department has focused on decreasing demand without any extra attention to service provision.
It closed three refugee reception offices, which contributed to the problems.
What happens when you visit a reception office?
There’s unwieldy queue management, poor quality procedures and arbitrary discretion in issuing documents and renewals. People have to generally make multiple visits on a single issue and remain in the system for years.
Many official actions are guided by revenue collection.
Where are the highest and lowest levels of corruption?
Marabastad in Pretoria, and Durban. At Marabastad, 51 percent reported corruption in the queue, with 30 percent reporting being denied access to the queue because they couldn’t pay and 31 percent experiencing corruption in the actual reception office.
At Marabastad, 47 percent are asked for money to resolve the issue they went to the office to resolve in the first place.
How long should the process take?
56 percent of respondents have been in the system for more than 180 days, which is the time period stipulated in the Regulations to the Refugee Act for the asylum process to be completed.
Respondents had spent an average of 1 037.5 days in the system or 2.8 years. The longest time spent in the system was 18.65 years.
Which are the 10 most represented asylum applicant countries?
DRC, Zimbabwe, Ethiopian, Nigeria, Somalia. Burundi is the top sending country on the rise.
Other nationalities encountered with some regularity include Ghanaians, Ugandans and Malawians.
What amounts are being paid in bribes?
Mostly, asylum-seekers are asked to pay more than R700, but some have paid as much as R2 500, just to be helped.
Who’s asking for the bribes?
Security guards, civilians or brokers who have connections with Home Affairs staff, and officials themselves. DHA interpreters and police officers were also implicated.
Voices:
“They ask for money outside and they share with the security guard. Inside, we are called to a room. They call one of us who must ask for R200 from the others and then when you collect the permit, the official has already gotten the money.” (Marabastad)
“It is corruption everywhere. They are camped from outside to inside.” (Marabastad)
“People ask for money. Officials don’t help you or tell you what is happening. They play on their phones. Security guards ask for money but not openly.” (Cape Town)
* Amit, PhD, is a senior researcher at the African Centre for Migration and Society which is part of the Wits School of Social Sciences.
** The views expressed here are not necessarily those of Independent Media.
Pretoria News