Given the state and budget of the SANDF, the only practical solution is to scale down our ambitions, says Helmoed Romer Heitman.
Pretoria - While it was not surprising that there was no major increase in defence funding, given the state of the economy, the decrease in real terms was disappointing. It was also unfortunate at a time when the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) remains unstable and there is serious instability along the perimeter of the SADC, which will impact on South Africa.
That said, the Budget did have interesting aspects: it included funding for off-shore patrol vessels to take pressure off the frigates, for light and medium transport aircraft and for cyber defence capability. And for increased funding for education and training establishments, which hints at preparing for an enhanced future force.
Missing was any indication that the government has applied its mind to whether South Africa will play a regional security role. The president had reiterated South Africa’s commitment to regional security and specifically to the AU’s new rapid response force (ACIRC), but theSANDF is not capable of any expanded commitment and is already overstretched.
That is demonstrated by the three-year pause in the roll-out of border safeguarding; and the battle of Bangui two years ago fatally demonstrated the SANDF’s inability to respond effectively to a crisis on the perimeter of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), let alone respond immediately further afield.
Yet there is no mention of any acquisition of the heavy/long-range transport aircraft essential to any regional role; the short-service intake has been cut, meaning no additional troops for the over-stretched army; and the three planned off-shore patrol vessels will not give South Africa regional capability – the 1998 Defence Review envisaged six vessels to complement the four frigates, with no notion of regional operations.
The problem is quite simply that we are attempting to play a regional role on funding levels appropriate to an enhanced border guard. That is not sustainable.
We must decide what we want: Do we want a border guard; do we want to protect vital interests outside our borders; do we want to help stabilise the perimeter of SADC to secure what is an important future market? That decision will require real thought based on a clear grasp of strategic interests and practicable funding. Penny-pinching ourselves into a strategic corner or striving for the unaffordable are not viable options.
What are our strategic interests?
Vital external infrastructure: The Cahora Bassa hydro-electric scheme, Maputo port and off-shore gas in Mozambique; the Highlands water scheme in Lesotho; the Ruacana hydro-electric scheme and off-shore gas in Namibia and, in future, the Grand Inga hydro-electric scheme in the DRC. All are vulnerable to attack in some form.
Mozambique Channel: We depend on shipping for trade and oil, with most of the latter coming through the channel and vulnerable to piracy and maritime terrorism. The geography of the channel suggests a need to prevent piracy establishing itself; rooting it out afterwards would be extremely difficult.
We need a stable and prosperous SADC and stable neighbours, as markets and to attract investment. Instability in the DRC, chaos in the Central African Republic (CAR), civil war in South Sudan, incipient guerrilla wars in Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi are all counter to our interests.
It is in our interest to be taken seriously, so we must “pay our dues”, including accepting regional security responsibilities commensurate with our economic strength.
None of this is altruistic or has anything to do with a “responsibility to protect”. All is selfish and based on our own long-term interests. There are extant threats and serious risks, and the speed with which northern Mali was overrun, the CAR collapsed and Boko Haram has spread its activities in Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon demonstrate how quickly a potential risk can become a real and pressing threat. In addition to deterrence/defence and border protection capability, we need the capability to:
* Protect external vital interests, together with the host countries or autonomously; and
* Help ensure the security of SADC and its waters, and of adjacent countries.
Ideally, we should also be able to provide forces for sustained peace support missions in Africa. But the SANDF has been badly underfunded for a quarter of a century and simply does not have that capability: The army lacks troops and air-deployable equipment for rapid deployment and much other equipment is 30 years old; the SAAF lacks heavy/long-range transports and tanker aircraft; the South African Nav has too few warships, only one support ship and no transports. And none of the services has the funds to do enough training.
Remedying this situation will not be a quick process, nor will it be cheap and the longer we take to begin the process, the more expensive it will become – and the greater the risk of a crisis catching South Africa unable to respond.
A decision is now extremely urgent, and business as usual is not a realistic option: that would only result in continued deterioration of the SANDF until it is little more than costly sheltered employment. Given the state of the SANDF and the envisaged funding for the next three years, the only practical solution is to scale down our ambitions and refocus our strategy.
We cannot scale down border, air space or maritime zones patrolling, as we are already doing far less than we should; we cannot withdraw the frigate from the Mozambique Channel, as that would invite piracy and general maritime crime; and we cannot withdraw from the DRC, as its stability is critical to SADC. In fact, we need more assets for border and maritime patrol, and should put forces into the north of the DRC to contain spill-over from the CAR. That leaves very little room for manoeuvre.
What we can do is withdraw our battalion from the UN-African peacekeeping force in Darfur, which is not of immediate strategic relevance to us; and withdraw from ACIRC, as we have no capability to deploy a combat group at all, let alone “immediately”.
Having cut back our commitments, we can begin to stabilise the Defence Force and optimise it for immediate tasks. The army can focus on training, rebuilding capability, filling capability gaps and replacing old systems; the SAAF can focus on training, replacing its WW 2 Dakota aircraft and acquiring maritime aircraft and helicopters; the navy can focus on acquiring off-shore patrol vessels; while the supporting services develop their matching capabilities.
After two or three years we can then consider deploying additional forces to the DRC, which is of considerable strategic relevance to us. Thereafter, we can begin to look to developing a regional capability commensurate with our economic strength. That will require additional expansion of all three combat services and, particularly, the acquisition of heavy/long-range transport aircraft, tanker aircraft, additional patrol vessels and at least one more support ship.
Care will have to be taken to acquire the correct aircraft and ships. Some maritime aircraft must have the range to cover the Marion Island waters and meet our search-and-rescue commitments, the transport aircraft must be able to transport medium vehicles to anywhere on the SADC perimeter without an intermediate stop and must be able to use small airfields and the off-shore patrol vessels must have the endurance, range and helicopter capability to complement the frigates in regional waters.
There is no point in spending money on equipment that cannot do the job.
The defence budget in an African perspective:
South Africa: $3 980 million (R46 billion) last year; $3 870 million this year.
Algeria: $10 400 million last year.
Angola: $6 800 million last year
Nigeria: $4 700 million last year
* Helmoed Romer Heitman is a military analyst and served on the recent Defence Review Committee.
** The views expressed here are not necessarily those of Independent Media.
Pretoria News