In the 1960s British Prime Minister Harold Wilson remarked that “a week is a long time in politics”. Last week the cabinet approved the new Defence Review, some 720 weeks since it approved the 1998 Review.
Much has changed in the intervening weeks: neither Africa nor the world have become more peaceful, and much of Africa outside the SADC is unravelling fast; the Defence Force has had two battalions deployed outside South Africa since 2001, three for most of that decade, peaking at four in 2006, plus a frigate in the Mozambique Channel since 2011, as against one battalion for no more than 12 months as envisaged at the time; and the Defence Force again patrolling the border, a task that would supposedly be handled by the police.
Since 2001, the Defence Force has had to deal with an ever-expanding mission, which would not be a problem if funding had kept pace. Instead, the budget has barely matched inflation, with the predictable – and predicted – result that the Defence Force has become grossly over-stretched.
That, in turn, has made it impossible to close critical capability gaps – air transport is one obvious issue, maritime patrol aircraft another; to replace old equipment; to maintain that old equipment properly or even train properly: the Air Force’s pilots do not fly enough and so leave; technical staff poached by industry cannot be replaced; and the Army has not conducted a full-scale brigade exercise since the 1990s.
Despite this, the Defence Force has performed very well operationally and tactically, and is the ninth largest provider of troops for peacekeeping in Africa.
But that cannot continue much longer, nor can it hide the fact that it has been in steady decline and lacks the funding to stop that decline, let alone reverse it.
The Defence Review must be read against that background. While it addresses a wide range of issues, the core issue is an analysis of what is happening around us, what government is likely to expect the Defence Force to do, and the type of Defence Force needed to perform those missions.
It is important to understand here that the Defence Review does not tell the government what it must do, but in effect says that, given what your foreign and national security policies appear to be, these are the sort of things that will need to be done and this is the sort of force you will need to do them.
For each of the roles and missions likely to arise, the Review sets a “level of ambition”, a force level adequate to ensure successful execution of that mission, but no more than that. There is little in the way of reserve capacity in the force levels proposed.
That approach has been accepted by the cabinet and, once the Review has gone to Parliament, the government will have to take some hard decisions: either begin rebuilding the Defence Force to the strength/capability mix proposed, or revisit its foreign policy to reduce the missions falling to the Defence Force.
To help with this process, the Review sets out a phased approach, beginning with what is needed to halt the decline, which the government can implement at a rate and to an extent it chooses, with a clear understanding of the strategic risks involved.
The Review also sets out a rough estimate of what funding levels will be required to achieve each milestone – rough because it is for the Defence Force to develop a detailed force design and phasing, which will allow it to develop a costing outline.
The Review merely sets down the capabilities that will be required if the Defence Force is to meet the demands likely to be made of it, and an outline structure within which those capabilities should be developed.
A particular aspect of this has been to move away from the business management approach implemented at the end of the 1990s, which has resulted in a clumsy, unresponsive and overly costly organisation, towards military organisations and processes that are known to work.
Contrary to some reports, the Review does not call for any particular level of defence spending; it provides an estimate of what it will cost to achieve and maintain each of the five identified milestones – from stopping the decline to being able to respond to likely security challenges, up to being able to fight a limited war.
The figure of 3.3 percent of GDP spending on defence which has been mentioned in some reports, refers to Milestone 5 – what would be required to develop the capability to fight that limited war.
That would only become necessary if there were to be a major deterioration in the security/stability of Africa south of the Equator. The actual interim target of being able to sustain the current operational tempo and retain some reserve capability for unforeseeable crises is Milestone 3, which would cost about 2 percent of the present GDP and rather less than that if economic growth can be accelerated.
Milestone 4 sets out what will be required to provide South Africa with the Defence Force able to meet likely future challenges and to provide a sound foundation for an expansion in the event of a major military threat arising. That would cost about 2.4 percent of the present GDP and much less if the economy expands.
It must also be remembered that much of the additional expenditure required to reach Milestones 3 and 4 would actually be spent in South Africa on the salaries of additional personnel, acquisition of equipment in South Africa, and the salaries of the people who will manufacture that equipment.
So while it will be a cost to the Treasury, most of it will not be an actual cost to the country, and some of it will serve as a multiplier, stimulating additional economic activity.
Other key aspects specifically addressed by the Defence Review are:
* Development of military leaders, with strong emphasis on professionalising the military, including a total revamp of the military education and training systems;
* Reintroducing normal military disciplinary systems to replace the present hybrid system that has clearly failed;
* Streamlining the procurement system, with emphasis on decentralising procurement, both to make it more efficient and to enable the Defence Force to support local businesses in their immediate vicinity, rather than having to procure routine consumables from some company selected by the Treasury as part of the centralised procurement concept that has proved entirely unresponsive to practical and operational realities; and
* Setting out defence industry policy, on the basis of which the Defence Force and Armscor can develop an acquisition and industrial strategy, and which the industry can use to plan properly. That policy also for the first time clearly defines what are regarded as South African companies – in three classes – and what types of equipment will be restricted to such local companies as far as is possible.
The bottom line is that this Defence Review has covered a lot of ground. But it is also imperative to grasp that this Defence Review is not “it”: it does not pretend to be the final word on South African defence policy and strategy.
What it does do is lay the foundation for the Defence Force to begin realistic planning to meet the challenges coming its way, and provide a starting point for a series of five-yearly reviews that will ensure South Africa does not again find itself in a situation where what it expects of its Defence Force is so utterly out of line with the funding it provides that same Defence Force.
* Römer Heitman is a member of the Defence Review Committee.