Cyril Ramaphosa’s career has been notable, but his role in the Marikana killings is hard to overlook, says Tim Crowe.
Cape Town - The recently much-maligned Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa played an enormously important role in promoting the development of trade unions; negotiations to a peaceful end of apartheid and steering the country towards its first democratic elections; and the creation of South Africa’s constitution.
He is also the chairman of the National Planning Commission, which is responsible for strategic planning for the country.
However, in 1997, after failing to achieve his political goals within the ANC, he left politics and pursued a fantastically successful career in business. With his brother-in-law, he is one of the richest men in Africa, with Forbes estimating his wealth at US$675.
Part of his wealth resulted from being a shareholder and director of Lonmin plc – owner of the mine in Marikana, and employer of miners killed in the area. Lonmin perpetuated apartheid working conditions for its workers at Marikana, while shifting significant profits to Bermuda to avoid paying South African tax. This was done at the urging of Incwala Resources, a company under Ramaphosa’s control.
Furthermore, he was at the Lonmin board meeting of July 25, 2012, where a decision was taken that the representations of the Marikana strikers would not be engaged. Finally, he was fully aware of the plight of the miners at Marikana, since he built up the biggest and most powerful trade union in South Africa – the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), which was intimately involved with actions that precipitated the massacre.
The Marikana “bloodbath” (34 dead, more than 70 wounded) was perpetrated by Special Task Force (STF), an “elite” special police unit created by the apartheid regime for counterterrorism, to deal with insurgency and hostage rescue. During the shooting, the STF ultimately used sub-machine guns loaded with live ammunition in what is undeniably the worst abuse of South African police action since the shootings at Sharpeville by apartheid police in 1960. Like at Sharpeville, most of the victims were shot in the back, and many victims were shot far (as much as 300m) from police lines.
Lonmin’s primary reaction to the massacre was to blame the union involved with the strike and to demand that workers return to work or face dismissal. After delaying treatment for the wounded protesters, the police in turn arrested 270 of them, charging them with murder. Of those, 150 claimed to have been beaten while under custody.
In his brief (30-minute) testimony to the Farlam Commission, Ramaphosa admitted to “being briefed by senior management of Lonmin on the escalating violence taking place at Marikana” and that “Lonmin was anxious that government urgently be informed of the seriousness of the situation”.
The e-mail from a senior Lonmin boss to Ramaphosa said: “We need help. I urge you to please use your influence (he was not at the time a formal governmental employee) to bring this over to the necessary officials who have the necessary resources at their disposal.”
Ramaphosa also quoted an e-mail he sent to Lonmin on the day before the massacre: “The terrible events that have unfolded cannot be described as a labour dispute. They are plainly dastardly criminal and must be characterised as such. In line with this characterisation there needs to be concomitant action to address this situation.”
“Accordingly, I undertook to speak with government. I discussed the matter with the then-Minister of Police (Nathi Mthethwa). I stressed that the SAPS needed to take appropriate steps to ensure they protect life and property and to arrest the perpetrators of the terrible acts of violence and murder. The minister indicated to me that this was the SAPS’ objective. “I also discussed the matter with the Minister of Mineral Resources (Susan Shabangu).
“The import of my discussion with her was to bring to her attention the increasing acts of violence taking place at Marikana, which in Lonmin’s view were criminal and which were not going to be resolved without political intervention. Minister Shabangu agreed with Lonmin’s characterisation of the situation and indicated to me that she would bring the matter to the attention of the Cabinet and the President. She also indicated to me that she would discuss the matter further with the Minister of Police.”
So, Ramaphosa and Zuma and his relevant ministers understood what was going on at Marikana, and Ramaphosa agreed with Lonmin bosses that the protesters were criminals. Ramaphosa then used his political connections to discuss the protest with the ministers of Police and Mineral Resources who, in turn, used their positions to engineer what needed to be done.
The actual task of leadership in dealing with protesters was delegated to North West provincial commissioner, Lieutenant-General Zukiswa Mbombo, a long-time employee of the police force whose primary experience was in matters relating to medical aid and finance.
Mbombo reported to National police commissioner, General Riah Phiyega, (appointed only two months prior to the massacre) whose post-school training was in social science/work.
She had no career experience in police work. Despite subsequent statements to the contrary, on the day before the massacre, Mbombo, for reasons never explored closely, had decided to deal decisively with the strike, and briefed Phiyega on what was to be “an ill-planned, poorly commanded” operation to disperse, disarm and arrest protesters. She will be remembered forever for saying, on 16 August, 2012: ‘Today we are ending this matter’.”
So, in the end, who is accountable for the massacre? If the ANC government were as “honourable” as the indefensible apartheid regime, both police commissioners and ministers should be removed from office and/or stripped of salary/pension benefits, as was minister of police and justice Jimmy Kruger for his ultimate responsibility with regards to Steve Biko’s murder.
Using the US as an example for a possible sanction, Richard Nixon was forced to resign from the presidency because of his involvement with an office break-in.
And Bill Clinton was nearly impeached for having an extramarital sexual liaison.
Therefore, for his irrefutable leading role in Rhodes-like exploitation and oppression of black miners (whose lot he formerly promoted), his other questionable Lonmin-related dealings and political interventions regarding the massacre at Marikana, Ramaphosa should suffer the same fate, or at least be banned from contesting for the presidency of the ANC and of South Africa.
Yet, despite this, many in-the-know political commentators favour Ramaphosa’s ascendancy.
Ultimately, because we live in a one-person, one-vote democracy, voters have the power to deal with the deputy president.
* Emeritus Professor Tim Crowe writes from Newlands in his personal capacity.
** The views expressed here are not necessarily those of Independent Media.
Cape Times