The only time a central banker is popular is when he is cutting interest rates. And, even then, he may not cut them fast enough for his critics.
Tito Mboweni, whose 10-year term as governor of the Reserve Bank ends on Sunday, knows this very well.
He has become a controversial figure because of his tough stand against inflation, which has helped support the rand.
This hard-earned reputation contrasts with the market's view of him when his appointment was announced 11 years ago: the rand tumbled on concerns that he had the wrong credentials for the job.
The news that the 39-year-old Mboweni would replace retiring incumbent Chris Stals came on a Saturday - July 4, 1998. At 9am on the following Monday, the Sapa news service reported that the rand had lost 5.3 percent of its value, sinking "to its weakest ever level against the US dollar".
"Ex-communists don't usually meet the criteria for a central banker," a currency trader told Sapa at the time.
Not only was Mboweni's struggle background held against him but, as the first post-1994 labour minister, he had introduced labour legislation perceived to be counter-productive by many economists as well as business community leaders.
In a recent address Mboweni said: "I am the first to admit that some things could have been done differently. Hindsight, however, is useful only when it improves our foresight."
He also said: "The labour movement regarded me as a hero then."
Mboweni has defended the framework he introduced as labour minister. In a recent interview he said that it was and remained "appropriate".
He said the problem was that managers had not given themselves time to become familiar with the legislation. "People don't follow the procedures and then get into trouble."
Mboweni's appointment as governor-elect of the central bank came at a challenging time - in the wake of the east Asian currency crisis that set the scene for currency weakness in all emerging markets.
Earlier that July, prime interest rates had risen to 24 percent, as governor Stals pushed up the central bank's key rate to shore up the domestic currency.
The following month, it rose to 25.5 percent.
With interest rates at a record high, the economy contracted 0.9 percent in the third quarter of 1998.
Not only did Stals hike interest rates, he threw huge resources into the battle to protect the rand, leaving Mboweni with a massive net open forward position (NOFP). The NOFP is the difference between net official reserves and the Reserve Bank's commitments in foreign currencies (its net oversold forward position).
Stals intervened aggressively in the currency market late in May, when the rand started its long fall, but he failed to stop the currency falling from R5.10 to the dollar to R6.62 on July 6.
To prevent the unit falling even more sharply the bank bought rand on the spot and forward foreign currency markets, digging deep into its supply of dollars.
The operations pushed the NOFP from $12.8 billion in April to $17.9bn at the end of May 1998, $22.5bn at the end of June and $22.9bn by the end of July. The huge exposure, which some analysts say turned the rand into a one-way bet, was finally eliminated in May 2003.
Mboweni decided never to repeat the mistake but to instead let currency markets run their course.
When he took over from Stals in August 1999, he chose to target only inflation - although as a contributor to inflation, the rand was clearly an issue. But, where Stals used both currency intervention and interest rates, Mboweni used only interest rates.
The policy proved controversial on several levels.
As the currency stabilised over the years, concerns began to switch from rand weakness to rand strength. While a weak rand erodes the internal value of the currency, stoking inflation, a strong rand makes exports less competitive on global markets. So, whenever the currency appreciates, exporters and the labour movement complain that the strong rand is an obstacle to economic growth and job creation.
Criticism comes also from those who want a stronger rand but believe that low interest rates are a greater incentive to foreign investors than high interest rates.
Low rates attract non-resident flows to the JSE while high rates encourage the carry trade - the practice of borrowing in low interest currencies and placing the funds on deposit in South African banks.
The rand's response to interest rate changes has been inconsistent, leaving the different positions open to debate.
The issue that has been the main rallying point for Mboweni's critics in trade union federation Cosatu has been inflation-targeting.
The movement accused him of interpreting his brief too narrowly and focusing on containing inflation within the 3 percent to 6 percent target range with little attention paid to growth. At a time when growth has been shrinking globally, support for the view has grown outside the trade union movement.
However, South Africa would have been more vulnerable to the world's debt crisis if Mboweni had not started the rate-hiking cycle in June 2006, reining in the debt-funded spending binge by early last year.
Moreover, South Africa has escaped the worst of the financial instability that sent the global economy into recession. The banking system, regulated by the Reserve Bank's supervision department, did not need massive rescue packages from the central bank and government to stay afloat- as was the case in other countries.
The central bank's credibility has also played an important part in making South Africa an attractive investment destination.
The man whose appointment caused a run on the rand in 1998 has turned a sinking currency into a two-way bet.
When his term of as governor ends, he can count the job well done.