Serious questions have been raised over the strike capability of the expensive new ships of the South African Navy (SAN). A new independent study claims they are vulnerable to attack from submarines, aircraft and warships, and have little ability to perform the key role of gunboat diplomacy through offshore bombardment.
These critiques emerge from an unpublished and unauthorised manuscript on the South African National Defence Force, A Guide to the SANDF, by defence analyst Leon Engelbrecht. It is the first study of the armed forces in 16 years.
Engelbrecht argues that the four new Valour-class frigates and three new Type 209 submarines are too light in their weapons and defencive counter-measures departments. This is the part of South Africa's multibillion-rand arms deal currently proving most controversial - because of an alleged $3-million (about R21-million) bribe paid by the frigate's builders, ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems, to former arms acquisition programme head Chippy Shaik.
But Helmoed-Römer Heitman, the Southern African correspondent for Jane's Defence Weekly and author of a similar study, South African Armed Forces (1990), said Engelbrecht had failed to take into account the significant upgrades planned for the naval weapons systems, the choices for which would become clear only as the new navy's role developed.
Rear Admiral Kevin Watson, the navy's project director for the acquisition of the vessels, confirmed that the bulk of the expenditure on the frigates (65 percent) had been on the ships, not their weapons systems. This, he admitted, was at odds with the international norm of a 70 percent ship/30 percent weapons split.
As a result, according to Engelbrecht, while the ships were top notch, there were significant weaknesses in the weapons, and the counter-measures the ships were able to deploy against enemy attack.
The frigates will be armed with eight Exocet missiles, 16 Umkhonto missiles, a single turreted Denel 76mm gun, Oerlikon 20mm cannons and a South African Denel/Reutech 35mm cannon.
According to Engelbrecht, the frigate's "current armament suited only for limited, short-duration self-defence". Its "land-attack capability limited to guns too light for the task" and it had "no land attack missiles". This inability to add muscle to incursions ashore is underlined by Engelbrecht's argument that "the class deliberately lacks a land- attack cruise missile capability for political reasons: such weapons are seen by some as 'too aggressive' and out of keeping with the Valour-class's 'defencive posture'.
"However, like its peers, the SAN recognises the growing importance of fighting in the littoral battle-space and supporting land forces ... As a result, a missile land-attack capability is likely to be added as funds become available and sensitivities are assuaged."
Heitman said that budgeting, not political shyness, had delayed the development of the navy's land-attack capacity. Still, in Engelbrecht's estimation, the frigates' existing weapons were not up to scratch:
- The French anti-ship "Exocet missile was too slow to penetrate modern air defences and too short-ranged to allow the mothership adequate stand-off to evade detection and response Some commentators have criticised the choice of the Exocet ... because of its lack of land-attack ability ... Others have hammered the system for its age (developed in 1967), its low relative speed and small warhead, compared with some more modern systems such as the Indo-Russian BrahMos," which was touted to the SAN at last year's Africa Aerospace and Defence show in Cape Town.
Heitman suspected the SAN had bought one Exocet and leased the rest, but would upgrade to the latest, longer-range (173km) model, which had land-attack capabilities. The SAN was also interested in the supersonic 300km-range BrahMos cruise missile.
- The South African Denel Umkhonto-IR is a short-range (12km) anti-aircraft missile, which is still in its development stage, having been "tested only to a limited extent", while "several navies and air forces already have supersonic anti-ship missiles. How the Umkhonto will deal with these is not known." The frigates can have their capacity doubled to 32 Umkhontos, but will probably carry only eight missiles and so "can easily be swamped by saturation attack".
Also, after a missile has been fired, empty launch canisters have to be removed from their silos, but: "As far as can be determined, this cannot be done by the Valour-class at sea, reloading will have to be done alongside or require a replenishment vessel, as a depot ship, in calm seas".
Heitman admitted the missiles might have difficulty intercepting supersonic assaults, but said the Finns' recent acquisition of the Umkhonto and Sweden's interest showed the missile was taken seriously. He added that no navy was able to reload its vertically launched anti-aircraft missiles at sea.
- The Italian OTOBreda 76mm cannons were acquired for the Warrior-class strike-craft in 1977 and four reconditioned ones were fitted to the frigates as "an interim cost-saving measure. Senior naval officers are well aware the gun is too small to effectively support forces ashore."
Heitman agreed, but also echoed Engelbrecht in saying the SAN was looking to replace the 76 with a navalised 155mm gun, which could use Denel's world-class G5 and G6 ammunition. Such a long-rage gun, rather than missiles, would be able to bombard enemy air bases, gun emplacements and ports. But this, Heitman argued, would be relevant only once the SAN had acquired multi-role ships capable of landing troops to secure beachheads softened by such bombardment.
In addition, the frigates were not fitted with torpedoes (as they were capable of), and its anti-submarine warfare ability was very basic, Watson admitted. Heitman said "there's absolutely f*** all can do to a submarine except ram it".
But the frigates would all go through "a massive upgrade" of their weapons, counter-measure and weapons-control systems in the coming years, he said.
Watson said the frigates' helicopters would initially be used in a surveillance role because they increased the ships' line of sight from 37km to 555km.
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