Replacing Gordhan will have a heavy cost

Pravin Gordhan. Picture: Reuters

Pravin Gordhan. Picture: Reuters

Published Feb 21, 2017

Share

Many see the decision by South Africa’s

governing African National Congress (ANC) to send the disgraced former

CEO of the power utility Eskom to parliament as the precursor to another attack on

the National Treasury and to remove finance minister Pravin Gordhan.

The decision to give Brian Molefe a seat in the country’s

parliament has led to widespread speculation that he is being

positioned for a cabinet post – either as finance minister or as deputy finance

minister. While some commentators believe that President Jacob Zuma has his

sights set on appointing Molefe as finance minister, others argue that

the real target is Deputy Minister Mcebisi Jonas. The deputy minister blew

the whistle on an alleged bribery attempt by a member of the Gupta family

which is at the centre of a political storm amid allegations that it has

attempted to exert undo influence on Zuma.

Either way, there is no doubt that Molefe’s appointment

to either position would cause substantial turmoil in the country’s financial

system and cost South Africa billions of rand.

The cost of the rand taking a knock

South Africa would take a massive economic blow because

its currency would depreciate dramatically. The rand  fell through

the floor the last time Zuma made a misbegotten attempt to  install one

of his cronies at the helm of the National Treasury in December 2015.

This should worry South Africans. The country’s current

account  deficit in

the third quarter of 2016 was 4.1 percent. This means that the sum of imports

and external debt – borrowing from abroad – is larger than the sum of its

exports and lending abroad. Mineral products, machinery and chemical products

alone  constitute more

than 50 percent of South Africa’s imports. A weaker rand would make these more

expensive since the country would have to pay more rand per dollar value. This

means that prices for everything from consumer products to transportation would

go up. South African firms, which often depend on intermediate inputs from

abroad, would face a rise in the cost for their products and an erosion of

their profits. As a consequence, fewer people would invest in the country.

A currency depreciation would affect investors in other

ways too. A weaker rand would diminish their returns and they would therefore

be more likely to look for investment opportunities elsewhere. Not only will

they stop investing, they would also likely unwind their existing positions.

This in turn would drain liquidity from the financial system, making banks less

likely to provide new loans for businesses. The knock on effect would be lower

growth and higher unemployment.

It is difficult to put a number on the impact of a sudden

depreciation of the rand. But some simple back-of-the-envelope calculations can

help. South Africa spends roughly $10 billion more on imports than it gets from

exports. This corresponds roughly to R130 billion per year. If the rand weakens

from 13 to 14 rand per $1, the country would need another R10 billion to

finance its trade imbalance.

South Africa has watched this movie before. Between

November 2015 and January 2016 when Zuma installed the backbencher Des van

Rooyen as finance minister the rand weakened from R14.4 to R16.9 per dollar.

This R2.5 increase per dollar corresponded to additional R25 billion cost to

finance our trade deficit. On top of this private investors are

estimated to have lost R171 billion after finance minister Nhlanhla Nene was

fired in 2015.

Secondary effects

Removing either the finance minister or his deputy would

also result in rating agencies downgrading the country’s investment rating to

junk status.

Zuma has shown in the past that he has no clue about the

impact of ratings on the country’s finances. Amidst threats of downgrade late

last year Zuma was quoted as saying:

But although

they’re important, their ratings don’t necessarily have an impact on the

agreements and commissions South Africa have entered into with other countries.

This simply is not true. A downgrade affects the interest

rates on every new bond issuance. Every year some of our outstanding R2 trillion  domestic and

R141 billion foreign denominated debt has to be  rolled

over. Debt services are already at roughly R150 billion per year – the

second largest position in the country’s  budget.

A 5% increase in the country’s refinancing cost would already cost South Africa

additional R7.5 billion every year. Money that is missing to finance social

grants, healthcare, police or student bursaries.

The banking group Absa did some sample calculations on

how a ratings downgrade would affect the average South African. It concluded

that every adult person would lose roughly R2,000 because a ratings downgrade

would mean that the banks themselves would face higher refinancing costs. These

would be passed on to their customers.

These numbers mirror a World Bank estimate that

a ratings downgrade in South Africa would result in a reduction of R1 000 per

capita by the end of 2017.

The numbers paint a clear picture. Zuma’s last attack on

the National Treasury cost South Africa billions. Molefe’s appointment

would be seen as another attack on the institution given that he was implicated

by the former public protector Thuli Madonsela in her state capture report.

The effect of his appointment would be equally costly for the country.

South Africans should not allow this raid on the National

Treasury to happen. The last time Zuma and his allies attempted to capture a

well-functioning institution for their own personal gains the private sector

gave them a hiding. The good news is that it is likely that markets will show a

strong reaction this time, too. The question is whether ordinary South Africans

realise the threat that a captured National Treasury would pose to their

wallets and stand up before it is too late.

Dr Co-Pierre Georg  is a senior lecturer at the African Institute for Financial Markets and Risk Management (AIFMRM) at UCT.

THE CONVERSATION

Related Topics: