The political will on both sides suggests the possibility of a negotiated solution to the Afghan war exists, but it needs Pakistan’s help, writes Shannon Ebrahim.
The most realistic chance for a negotiated peace between the Taliban and the Afghan government after 14 years of war fell apart just over three months ago. The resuscitation of peace talks is the only alternative to a war that has killed about 150 000 Afghans and is now considered the longest war in American history, having cost American taxpayers nearly $1 trillion (almost R14 trillion). It is hard to believe the Pentagon is now asking for an additional $120 billion to continue the war effort.
As South Africans, we always insist that there is no military solution, only a political one, and now that creed is never more relevant than in a conflict so far from our borders, but which enters our living rooms on a weekly basis.
We so easily lose track of the number of suicide bombings in Kabul or the rising casualties from Nato bombardments. But the convergence of local and regional interests that brought about the Murree Peace Process hosted by Pakistan in July this year is worth paying attention to, as it suggests that the possibility of a negotiated solution to the Afghan war certainly exists.
The peace talks held on July 7 and 8 in the Pakistani resort town of Murree were heralded as the best chance of bringing about a power-sharing agreement to end the fighting between the Afghan government and the Taliban. The UN Security Council and Nato welcomed the talks, and both the US and China attended as observers.
Pakistan was credited as having played a crucial role in facilitating the talks, particularly Pakistani Army Chief Raheel Sharif, who convinced Taliban representatives to participate in the negotiations. The significance of the talks cannot be overstated as it was the first time that the major stakeholders met face to face in 14 years.
The political will to find a solution on both sides was promising, with the Afghan government willing to discuss all issues, including the release of Taliban prisoners.
Following two successful days of talks, it was agreed that a second round of meetings would take place on July 31 to discuss a truce and confidence building measures.
Before the second round could commence, information was leaked that the leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, had died two years previously in a Karachi hospital. The implications were dire as the Taliban negotiators had claimed that he had supported the peace talks. Not only did the revelation of Omar’s death bring about internal conflicts within the Taliban itself, but there were questions over the real authority of those doing the negotiating.
Allegations were made that the leaks about Omar’s death came from the Afghan National Directorate of Security, as some elements were hostile to the notion of striking a deal with the Taliban, or sharing power. Some Pakistani officials blamed Indian intelligence for leaking the news of Omar’s death in the hopes of scuttling the peace talks in which Pakistan played too central a role.
The Pakistani political establishment is of the view that India’s agenda is to keep Afghanistan and Pakistan destabilised and on a warpath so as to increase its own influence over the political establishment in Kabul. The former Afghan president Hamid Karzai had favoured relations with India over Pakistan, and Pakistani officials believe that India felt threatened by the shift in foreign policy by the new Pashtun Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, who sought closer relations with Pakistan.
After coming into office, Ghani had initiated intelligence sharing with Pakistan, and joint operations targeting militants in the border regions.
From India’s perspective, the Indian government felt both ignored and frozen out of the peace talks, and Indian officials criticised them as being controlled and led by the Pakistan Intelligence Services. India was clearly blindsided by both the speed and progress of the talks.
Following the collapse of the talks, the Taliban was beset by internal power struggles which saw the old divisions within the movement emerge, the ones Omar successfully managed to bridge. Violence spiked with new waves of attacks on Kabul and Kunduz, but the Taliban remained united under Mullah Akhtar Mansoor, and wanted to make the point that it is still a lethal force to be reckoned with.
Despite the fact that the Afghan government has retaken Kunduz with the support of Nato, UN reports suggest the Taliban is more powerful now than at any point in the past 14 years.
If the Taliban was flexing its military muscle in order to enter negotiations from a position of strength, now may be the best time to convince them to restart peace talks.
Afghanistan’s best chance of engaging the Taliban in peace talks is to work with Islamabad. The dividends of peace are plentiful considering that the Afghan government claims it has ore and mineral deposits worth trillions of dollars.
It is time to put an end to the cycle of violence that is undermining Afghanistan’s vast economic potential.
* Ebrahim is Independent Media’s Group Foreign Editor. Her Global Eye column is published weekly.
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