National intelligence has a vital role to protect Eskom

"The purpose of counter intelligence action is to disrupt, and it is immaterial whether the facts exists to substantiate the charge." J. Edgar Hoover, a quote from the movie Black Light.

The current load shedding and power cuts, energy crisis, and the collapse of our critical energy infrastructure could have been averted if both our military and national intelligence institutions were functioning optimally to protect the state from any threats of collapse.

Every day, between the end of the day and start of a new day, a particular file of national strategic importance gets prepared to be delivered to the Head of the State, a classified document known as the intelligence briefing document.

But this document - a Risk and Threats Analysis Report - is of a high priority and the first priority on the list, every morning, detailing all national strategic issues, outlining the risks and threats associated with the issues of national interest and importance.

The job of the head of state is to familiarise themselves with these documents on a daily basis and consult for further insights with line functionaries within those Ministries and institutions outlined in the report, to give executive instructions and orders on what should be done after doing situation appraisal and consultations.

The energy crisis demonstrated to all of us South Africans how easy it is and how easy it can be overnight to collapse our way of life by simply switching off the lights and cutting off electricity, which is the lifeline of our economy.

The purpose of intelligence capabilities in a well run functioning state is to:

– provide the policy-makers timeous, critical and sometimes unique information to warn them of potential risks and dangers.

– to identify opportunities in the international environment through assessing real or potential competitors' intentions and capabilities.

– and to assist good governance through providing honest, critical intelligence that highlights the weaknesses and errors of government.

You can't have foreign governments and their agencies, together with their private entities and funded NGOs and NPOs of their choice, coming into South Africa (SA) seeking to influence, control, disrupt and destroy SA's energy policy.

It is not a secret that the energy sovereignty of our country is under serious threat from external competitors - a multi-layered threat driven by geopolitical interests and foreign policy interests agendas. Our energy security is facing multiple challenges: domestic, national, foreign and international.

We moved from the days of energy security and reliance to the current state of lack of energy security and reliability.

The economy, as a result, has almost tanked, with growth projected for the next three years at a meagre 1.5% annual gross domestic product growth. Whereas SA previously had a strong intelligence and military capabilities, a strong gross domestic product, as well as energy and sovereign security.

Yet, if you look at those countries with active operations in SA, their economies are booming at our expense. Since the collapse of core institutions, we have seen the direct impact and decline in energy security and reliable power generation supply capacity.

Here is the role that should be played by our intelligence institutions in SA regarding our energy security:

In the Intelligence Act there is a broad definition of the role and responsibility of a capable national intelligence. The Intelligence White Paper that later become the Intelligence Act stipulates clearly those roles under its definition section:

– 2.1 ‘’national intelligence’’ means integrated intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security of special concern to strategic decision-making at national level;

– 2.2 ‘’counter-intelligence’’ deals with offensive and defensive activities to neutralise the effectiveness of foreign/hostile intelligence operation; to protect sensitive information; and to counter subversion, sabotage and terrorism directed against personnel, strategic installations and material;

– 2.3 ‘’departmental intelligence’’ means the intelligence which Government departments and agencies need or generate to execute their (own) legal and functional responsibilities (in the interest of the State):

– 2.4 ‘’foreign intelligence’’ deals with information on external threats (or potential threats) as well as opportunities relevant to the protection and promotion of national interests and which can be used in the formulation of foreign policy;

– 2.5 ‘’domestic intelligence’’ deals with information of internal activities, factors and developments detrimental to national stability, as well as threats (or potential threats) to the constitutional order and the safety and well-being of the citizens of a country.

Now, looking at this definition, you would swear that we have no intelligence capabilities, because if we had strong intelligence capabilities, the issue of energy crisis should have never existed. We don't have capable, reliable intelligence capabilities safeguarding our energy sector and policy environment.

On the global scene, wars are regularly fought over energy, primarily over oil and gas, energy, security and sovereignty. And the energy conflicts in the Sahara-North Africa and Europe by now should have taught us a lesson.

Of late, SA, too, is a target for global conflict over energy.

But the conflict is not for access to our oil and gas. The conflict is to control and change SA's energy policy over coal, oil, gas and nuclear.

The battleground for energy is intensifying on African soil and South Africa in particular.

The only source of guaranteed energy is base-load power. For this, we are still totally reliant on Eskom's coal, partly nuclear and hydro, to drive our economy.

I would even include gas, but South Africa does not have a national industrial gas distribution infrastructure nor a single off-grid smart city to boast of any alternatives.

On my frequent visits abroad, I try to learn as much I can about the countries I am visiting and how they run, operate and protect their energy sector.

For instance, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has a very strong energy security policy strongly guarded and protected by the military and intelligence department. All its power stations are in a military designated zone.

Why has SA allowed for the best of our power station assets to deteriorate to such levels of collapse is unbelievable when other countries, such as the UAE, take care to protect these key assets with the due diligence and oversight they deserve.

It is key that SA realise the importance of our intelligence capabilities in protecting critical national assets, such as Eskom.

SA has the capability and the existence of credible institutions that, if revived, led and supported properly, can work to grow and protect the state.

Our work as citizens is to hold our government accountable for their role in establishing and running a capable state that will deliver for us a growing, thriving and socio-economically prosperous country with strong policy decisions making capabilities without interference from outside forces and interests.