America and crisis of ambiguity after Qassem Soleimani: the advent of the Commanders Network

Iranian military commander Qassem Soleimani was an organisational force and not a single one, says the writer. File picture: Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader via AP

Iranian military commander Qassem Soleimani was an organisational force and not a single one, says the writer. File picture: Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader via AP

Published Apr 14, 2022

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By C Williams

There is still an unanswered question: Was the assassination of Qassem Soleimani (Iranian military commander) in Iraq a clever and forward-looking action by the United States against its ideological enemy, Iran?

Therefore, ideology is discussed here. Evidently, the 1978 Iranian revolution had a different political outlook than that of US allies. The nature of the Iranian Revolution was formed in the struggle against the tyranny of a capitalist — a royal authoritarian regime that needed a foreign agent or power like the US to maintain governance.

American policymakers must be well aware of the nature of the Iranian Revolution and its revolutionaries, who consider America an imperialistic power and attribute the major corruption in international and regional relations to its imperialism.

Iranian radicals have provided ample evidence for this perception of the US, which has created a unified and strong mindset for Iranian military commanders. Hence, the military personnel whose job it is to defend the assets of society are constantly dealing with such a danger and its roots.

The idea that American political ideology is the cause of evil and the promoter of evil will naturally lead to attempts at distancing from the US and reducing the likelihood of harm.

This is also the prevailing attitude in the Iranian military. In fact, their main defence mission is to keep the US away from Iran and Iranian society. This was part of Soleimani's main mission to drive American troops out of the region, or, in Iranian terms, to repel US military evil.

However, this concern was not shouted out. The prominent dimension of the regional action of the Iranian military was to support the oppressed groups in addition to securing the region around Iran in private.

In fact, there is no emphasis on the presence of the US in the region, although this was a major goal for Iranians to benefit both sides. Therefore, the Iranian military conducted its program more calmly, whereas the Americans faced no frequent and widespread anger.

According to Israeli officials, the US-Israeli decision strangely disrupted the situation. This confusion raised the issue of the US's possible withdrawal from the region — which the Iranian military and resistance commanders indirectly declared outside of public opinion.

In fact, the demand of the military organisation automatically gained both national and regional aspects. This serious mistake was due to the Americans' lack of understanding of Soleimani's character and the reasons behind his popularity.

There are many ways to know Soleimani. However, to understand his differences with the Iranian conservatives, it would be sufficient to state that he was a serious opponent of the traditional political and cultural stratifications in Iran. Therefore, they had friends from completely opposite political spectra. Interestingly, both sides accepted him. Moreover, Soleimani's supranationalism was also quite famous in society.

Naturally, it would be a strategic mistake to remove such a figure with that level of popularity in terms of shaping public opinion, which is very important to Americans.

However, the US decision-makers promised that they would kill the public figure first and then change the public opinion, a strategy which failed, and Iranians and supporters of the resistance in the region, two years after Soleimani's assassination, posted so much of Soleimani's hashtag with his photos and videos on Instagram that the Instagram executives closed the hashtag.

They also deleted the publisher's content and accounts and sent them a deletion alert. All this means that the money spent to change public opinion to reduce Soleimani's popularity has been thrown in the trash.

If the American decision-makers were persuaded to remove Soleimani due to his major role in the region, they would seem to have fallen into their own propaganda trap. Soleimani was an organisational force and not a single one.

All his communications and activities were based on the plans formulated by his organisation, the Quds Force and the Revolutionary Guards. In fact, he was not the major planner, but was the sole executor.

However, there is no doubt that he was a very competent performer, and his very high mobility, power and will compelled the Americans to kill him.

However, the following futuristic question did not seem to have a clear answer for the Americans:

If he is removed, what will be the status of his plans? What alternative will his organisation have? How would his organisation’s strategy change the day after he was killed?

In fact, the main question is: how much has the US thought about the future after the assassination of Soleimani?

According to an analysis of Iran's reports and behaviour in the region, the Quds Force has replaced Soleimani with an active network of specialised commanders instead of only one versatile commander.

In fact, the US action caused the Quds Force to change its strategy and transfer the mission of one person into the network structure to increase complexity and security. This is a serious threat to the US military system.

Furthermore, the US eliminated a person who was fully committed to his principles of behaviour. He was the one who made the most of his position in his organisation to establish these principles. Western reports about him indicate that Soleimani was fully committed to a ceasefire and that he would have been highly responsive to humanitarian requests, such as for the release of American prisoners.

Despite his fighting spirit, Soleimani was famous for being highly interactive, especially in terms of diplomatic interactions, something which some countries in the region benefited greatly from.

It must be admitted that his assassination plunged the bright atmosphere of confrontation between Iran and the US — or between the US and the Middle East Resistance — into a vague atmosphere, an ambiguity whose dark side has fallen on the US.

In other words, it was a mistake that some prominent American political and military institutions and figures have referred to as an Israeli trap. What the Trump team finally admitted: then-Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu was “willing to fight Iran to the last American soldier”.

* Chris Williams is an independent researcher in the field of security and politics. His study examines regional conflicts with a view to US policy.