Siyabonga Hadebe
Pretoria - A few years after Mangosuthu Buthelezi led the African natives in the Colony of Natal to a quasi- independent state called KwaZulu, the coastal province descended into a low-scale civil war that pitted his Inkatha Ye Nkululeko Yesizwe (now the IFP) and the then-exiled African National Congress (ANC) against one another.
This war claimed many lives, displaced millions, and burdened the already suffering Africans with poverty, almost-permanent violence, diseases, and other social ills.
The KwaZulu homeland was formed as one of the Bantustans by the white minority government as part of its segregationist, apartness (apartheid) policies.
What is often not said is that Buthelezi skilfully enmeshed this apartheid creation with the defunct Zulu empire. He expropriated all its symbols and institutions to establish what he mischievously labelled as “the legal home of all of the nation’s Zulus”.
This homeland was made up of 11 enclaves (detached sections) throughout Natal, occupying more than one-third of its territory.
Stretching from Ingwavuma to the Drakensberg, the quasi-state covered many nations that were defeated and subjugated by the colonialists in the 19th century.
Among these groups were AmaZulu, whose empire folded in 1879 after the defeat by the British.
Nongoma was the Bantustan’s capital before it was relocated in 1980 to Ulundi. This symbolic move was meant to retrace the history of AmaZulu using devious means since Ulundi was purportedly the last historic capital of the Zulu empire (supposedly founded in 1816 by Shaka). Ulundi remained its capital until the KwaZulu quasi-state was dissolved in the early 1990s.
Nevertheless, the creation of the homeland was a culmination of efforts by the European settlers to build one megatribe with one language and identity.
Buthelezi took these ideas a step further by promoting ethnic nationalism. Unfortunately, the politics of Zulu nationalism has a long history and has to be understood from its colonial contexts.
Writing about the rise of ethnic nationalism in Natal, Teun Baartman argues that black leaders in the 1920s and 1930s, like trade union leader George Champion and John Dube, an eminent “ikholwa” (black elite), associated themselves with the then down-and-out Zulu monarchy under Solomon ka Dinuzulu “to gain support from the Zulu population”.
Dube was one of the founders of an organisation called Inkatha ya ka Zulu in 1922.
According to historian Shula Marks, this organisation’s purpose was to bring together the Zulu people under the central figure of King Solomon and, in doing so, to reawaken Zulu national consciousness. It must be recalled that the phrase “Zulu” was used loosely to refer to all natives living in Natal.
What is evident is that black people reacted in two ways to the ethnic policy of the white state. Solomon and John Dube more or less shared the same ideology by stimulating ethnic nationalism as evidenced by the Inkatha ya ka Zulu.
The ANC always retained its multiracialism posture. Black Consciousness was about “the liberation of the black people and the achievement of “Black Unity”.
Overall, black nationalists opposed the policy of resettling black people in homelands and criticised homeland leaders like Buthelezi for what they saw as a stimulating of ethnic nationalisms.
In 1975, Buthelezi emerged as the leader of the KwaZulu homeland and began manipulating Zulu ethnic nationalism via Inkatha YeNkululeko yeSiswe.
The exploitation of Zulu nationalism was a very useful means to consolidate Buthelezi’s leading position in KwaZulu.
Following Dube’s steps, Buthelezi started as an adviser to King Cyprian in the 1950s and was never bothered about boasting of his traditional credentials. According to Buthelezi, there was “no reason for a Zulu to be ashamed of his ethnic background”.
The Zulu nationalist sentiment of Inkatha was reflected in every sense. Buthelezi was not shy to invoke a proud warrior heritage going back to Shaka, the “black Napoleon”.
People such as Harry Gwala, Muzi “Magagula” Makhaye and other leaders in Natal knew Inkatha’s background and its modus as a Zulu nationalist movement.
When Nelson Mandela extended an olive branch to forge peace between the warring parties, Gwala did not support this move.
Nonetheless, Shell House dispatched Jacob Zuma to facilitate peace talks and eventually to wrestle the province’s chequered politics from Buthelezi and Inkatha.
In retrospect, the ANC’s peace mission has come at a great cost to the former liberation movement. To win the hearts of the “Zulus”, the ANC abandoned its much-acclaimed historical mission of freedom and started to play according to the rules of the game Buthelezi created. Buthelezi’s strategy and raison d’etre hinged on toxic Zulu nationalism and “owning” the Zulu identity through the monarch and culture.
The ANC’s approach was to battle Buthelezi at his game by doing what others tried before it, that is, establishing proximity to the king as a way of gaining the so-called “Zulu” support.
However, this required serious concessions such as allowing Natal semi-federal traits with a king as its figurehead and using the fiscus to gain the king’s loyalty. In short, the strategy worked as the ANC won the province and replaced the IFP.
First of all, this created problems that the ANC has not resolved because the elevation of one individual planted resentment, as 11 recognised paramount chiefs of other provinces also aspired to the privileges and perquisites of the Zulu king. Second, the KwaZulu homeland was preserved through the now much-contested Ingonyama Trust against the backdrop of its unimpressive land redistribution policies after apartheid.
Third, there is also a failure to appreciate that KZN is a place with a very complex history, and that cannot be wished away.
In the main, the ANC has not focused on the emancipation of the African majority that suffered under colonialism, apartheid and, later, from the violence that raged for years.
The latter manifests in subcultures of izinkabi, amabhinca and others who ride on the wave of force and/or the tribe. Second, the ANC struggles to understand that the entire KZN is “organically IFP”, as Xolani Majola phrased it.
In “The Changing Face of Zulu Nationalism: The Transformation of Mangosuthu Buthelezi’s Politics and Public Image”, Bongani Ngqulunga discusses Buthelezi’s attempts for over 40 years “to change his political image from that of a Zulu nationalist to that of an elder statesman of South African politics, who advocates inclusive politics”.
A few months ago, his friends bestowed an honour on him as one of the country’s, and if not Africa’s, best statesmen.
Brenthurst Foundation’s Olusegun Obasanjo praised his “efforts in his fight for liberation and the struggles endured in his life while fighting for a better South Africa”.
Notably, the ANC did not object to these tributes and Kgalema Motlanthe, a prominent figure within the ANC, was present to witness the rewriting of history.
Where to from here for the ANC?
Unfortunately, the ANC is trapped in tribal affairs in its attempts to remain relevant.
The ANC’s journey to survive the challenges posed by KZN politics and tribal fog is a daunting task. To survive, the ANC must not only find a way to untangle itself from KZN politics and tribal dynamics but must also change tactics.
It must go back to its mission and invest in efforts to address socio-economic disparities and prioritise effective governance to meet the needs of the people of KZN, and all South Africans.
For KZN people, the political changes after 1994 are quickly becoming just another deferred dream.
The ANC must simply break free from the grip of tribal politics, overcome the challenges of ethnic nationalism and work towards a South Africa that truly upholds the rights, freedom, and empowerment of all its citizens.
* Hadebe is an independent commentator on socio-economics, politics and global matters.
** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.
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