ON FEBRUARY 7, 1922, thousands of striking white miners marched through the streets of Johannesburg under a banner stating, “Workers of the World Fight and Unite for a White South Africa.”
Strikes were not new to the Witwatersrand in the first two decades of the 20th century. As the economy of the region shifted rapidly from agriculture to mining, labour – specifically cheap labour – became a key issue for the capitalists whose investments began playing an increasingly crucial role in the economic growth of the country.
On the mines, the term “cheap labour” was a synonym for “African labour”. In many areas of the industry, the wage of a black mineworker was a tenth of what a mine owner had to pay a white mineworker.
The mine owners were quite prepared to increase the numbers of their black migrant labour force – and, in fact, from time to time, lobbied the South African Party government for permission to change the ratio of black to white workers on the mines. But in many ways, the hands of the government – especially the administration run by Jan Smuts prior to 1922 – were tied.
Smuts was aware of how a growing poor white – and mainly Afrikaner – male population who were flocking to the mines for employment could hurt him at the polls if they were passed over, or retrenched, in favour of Africans.
There was also a social aspect that needed to be addressed: most poor whites had gravitated towards the poorer areas of the Rand, in the same areas that poor blacks were living. The government saw this as a major problem.
The last thing it wanted was to see large numbers of unemployed whites living in “idleness” close to blacks. Of concern to them, too, was the growing “criminal” population among poor whites.
The source of survival among many whites was the illegal selling of liquor to blacks. As far back as 1914, a government report noted that 727 whites had been jailed for this offence, which “weakened white rule”.
The report added: “The European minority occupying… the position of the dominant race cannot allow a considerable number of its members to sink into (poverty) and to fall below the level of the non-European workers.”
The 1922 Rand revolt centred on the determination of mine owners to remove the colour bar – and the insistence of white workers that it be maintained. The motivation of the bosses was built on the simple concept of pounds and pence: a difference in working costs in the gold mines of just a shilling a ton meant a difference in profits of £1.5 million.
The combination of cheap African labour translating into big profits was a compelling reason for them to push the state to dismantle the colour bar. But with the price of gold being relatively stable from 1910 to 1921, the government did not deem it necessary to act.
However, by the end of 1920, the price of the metal dropped and in 1921, when the cost of living followed the price of gold downwards, the Chamber of Mines and the South African Industrial Federation agreed on cost-cutting measures.
Mine owners, convinced they would never get a better opportunity to push through the changes they deemed necessary to ensure the profitability of the mines, refused to back down. Workers responded by announcing they would strike.
Smuts’s cabinet in turn promised that the mines would stay open – even if this meant placing them under police protection. Everything was in place for a perfect storm. And yet, it was not on the gold mines that the revolt started…
On January 2, 1922, coal miners in Witbank downed tools over the proposed pay cuts. A little over a week later, on January 10, 24 000 members of the South African Industrial Federation joined the Witbank strikers in downing tools.
Things moved quickly from this point: Smuts, convinced that the National Party would try to gain political advantage over the strikes, postponed the opening of parliament.
Then, on January 28, came the point of no return.
The Chamber of Mines, believing it was acting from a position of strength, announced an increase in the ratio of black to white workers from 8.2:1 to 10.5:1. This would have resulted in the loss of up to 2 000 more white jobs. It also scrapped paid holidays on May Day and Dingane’s Day – of symbolic significance to English and Afrikaans workers.
Smuts tried to be even-handed. He promised that the government would “draw a ring around both parties, do its best to maintain law and order, and let the two parties fight it out". But in an ominous new development, militant Afrikaner nationalists began organising the strikers along “commando” lines.
On February 12, Smuts called on the miners to return to work, promising police protection. But by then, the time for talking had passed.
A militant Action Committee, including members of the Communist Party, took over the leadership of the strike. And although the Communists repeatedly urged the Afrikaner mining commandos not to attack Africans, their calls fell on deaf ears. A number of Africans were murdered in racially motivated attacks.
On February 21, the chamber asked Smuts to declare martial law. While he dithered, the strike leaders lost control of the strike to the Afrikaner commandos. At 4.30am on March 10, 1922, bloody street battles between heavily armed white mineworkers and hard-pressed units of police and soldiers began raging throughout the Witwatersrand.
By 5.20am, the Eastern Transvaal town of Brakpan was overrun by the strikers. By 10.30am, nearby Benoni was under siege and enveloped in a pall of smoke as fighter aircraft, summoned from the military base at Roberts Heights, bombed and machine-gunned strikers’ positions.
In Johannesburg, dozens of police were taken prisoner as armed strikers took control of the working-class suburbs of Fordsburg, Newlands, Brixton and Vrededorp.
On that same day, Smuts acted: he declared martial law, went to the Rand and personally took control of more than 20 000 troops, backed by aeroplanes, tanks and field artillery.
Acting quickly, decisively and often mercilessly, Smuts’s troops swept into the Johannesburg showgrounds where the strikers had gathered and took 1 500 of them into custody.
His troops then moved to the Trades Hall, the headquarters of the strikers and arrested leaders who had been trapped there, jailing them in The Fort. The commandos retaliated by raiding police stations for arms. But Smuts, warming to the task, threw everything into quelling the rebellion.
Pilots, whose planes were armed with Lewis machine guns, had to fly at an altitude low enough to enable them “to establish the identity of the crowd and… to ensure, in case it became necessary to retaliate, that there were no women and children” in it. But women and children were killed.
After five days of fighting, the strike collapsed. Of the 214 killed, 76 were strikers. A total of 78 troops, 30 Africans (murdered by strikers) and 62 bystanders were also killed.
Of the 4 748 strikers who were arrested, 46 were charged with murder. Of these, 18 were sentenced to death, of which four were hanged.